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Eco-taxation is the preferred market based tool for achieving mitigation of CO2 emissions and 
fostering sustainability. It works through tax-induced changes in the price of polluting activities 
while ideally transferring the environmental cost to emitters and users. The initial eco-tax 
signaling is transmitted and further amplified to the rest of the economy through the structure of 
cost interactions. In particular, real-world economies work under wage adjustment rules that 
reflect downward rigidity in labor costs when facing rising prices. These common rules may in 
fact affect the mitigation capacity of the eco-tax policies. We study this issue using an 
interindustry model in which we overcome the classical dichotomy between prices and 
quantities thanks to the novelty of connecting consumption demand with the changes in private 
income levels that would follow from the enacted eco-tax. We isolate income effects by keeping 
the given productive structure of the economy as unaltered as possible. In this sense, the 
proposed model has a bit of a neo-ricardian flavor. We implement the model and check the 
mitigation effectiveness of two different eco-tax policies using recent tabular data for the 
Spanish economy in 2015. The main conclusion is that we would not observe double benefits, 
even when all eco-tax collections are recycled back into the economy. 
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 Eco-tax policies are less effective for carbon mitigation under tax recycling 
 More intense wage adjustment rules lessens welfare erosion 
 We find no trace of a double dividend 
 We incorporate a simple dynamic rule for wage adjustments 
 Feedback from prices to quantities achieved using a novel income linkage 
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There is a rich body of literature dealing with eco-taxation and its carbon mitigation 
potential. Since taxation influences resource allocation, general equilibrium methods 
become the natural analytical tool for policy evaluation. More specifically, 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) models combine a conceptual modelling 
platform with background empirical data. They have the distinctive advantage that are 
able to determine at the same time prices and quantities. These computational models 
go beyond the private demand and private supply scheme of the theoretical model 
versions and include descriptive aspects of real-world economies such as government 
policies and trade issues. The seminal paper of Shoven and Whalley (1985) is still the 
best description of the essentials and possibilities of these models. See also André et al 
(2005), Kiuila et al (2019), Freire and Ho (2019) for detailed description of 
environmental policies using CGE models and Fullerton and Muehlegger (2019) for a 
discussion of the burden of environmental tax regulations.  
From an empirically oriented policy perspective, the CGE approach is usually quite 
convenient since these methods provide the combined overall effects that are of direct 
interest to policymakers. At the same time, however, the simultaneous determination of 
prices and quantities endows the results with a certain degree of opacity. The reason is 
that it is not easy to separate substitution effects from income effects when comparing 
two equilibrium states. A possible solution is the use of interindustry models since in 
them prices and quantities do not interact. See Miller and Blair (2009) for the general 
theory of interindustry models, and Roland-Holst and Sancho (1995) for a theory of 
price influence and transmission in this setting. A reinterpretation of these models in 
Sraffa (1960) offers an inspiring neo-ricardian perspective in price determination and 
income distribution in private property economies with no trade or government 
intervention. In this type of pure production economies, with a given and fixed 
productive structure, prices play the function of ensuring the reproducibility of all flows 
while maintaining the overall productive structure.  
We adopt this reproducible perspective here but we adapt it to an empirically rooted 
economy with an active government and other sources of final demand, like trade. In 
actual practice, governments intervene in the economy via taxation and expenditure 
policies. The combined use of these fiscal tools allows governments to steer the 
economy towards desirable social or environmental targets. See for instance Bardazzi 
(1996), Llop and Pié (2008), Gemechu et al (2013), de Souza et al (2016) for specific 
environmental applications using the interindustry setting.  
A critical part often overlooked in price determination is the dynamics of the wage rate 
in response to price changes. Taxation affects prices and therefore living conditions 
through the purchasing power of wage income. In any real-world economy, the actual 
wage rate is the result of many concurrent factors. In particular, of the power of the 
labor force to negotiate agreements that allow the wage rate to keep its purchasing 
power, in total or, most often, just in partial terms. The labor market is, possibly, the 
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market that stands most distant from the frictionless market paradigm so common in 
economic theory. We try to tackle this situation using a simple, although quite 
representative in practical terms, behavioral rule of wages. We will assume that, at the 
economy-wide market level, wages follow an adaptive rule that tracks the evolution of 
prices. The goal of the rule is to have the purchasing power of salaries aligned with 
prices. Since bargaining power is not complete, the wage rate usually lags behind prices 
when they rise but it keeps its value constant, in nominal terms, when they do not. 
Therefore, we assume the wage rate to be downward sticky or rigid. For the rest of 
markets, we will assume that exchange values adjust with no impediments to reproduce 
the given structure of the economy.  
We examine the role of an eco-tax in this setting. The presence of a new tax on 
polluting activities will modify the whole set of exchange values since it will affect 
these activities’ production costs. Additionally, the eco-tax will also change the level 
and composition of tax collections. Since the government uses its tax revenue to finance 
its activities, specifically the full set of social transfers (pensions, subsidies, labor 
compensation, etc.) to workers and their families, any tax-induced change in prices will 
also have an effect in the set of flows that define the income structure of the economy. 
Indeed, the government usually adjusts these income transfers to the evolution of prices 
to keep constant their perceived social value. Besides these price-indexing adjustments, 
the government may choose to use its newly found eco-tax collections to reduce the 
public deficit (from the augmented tax burden) or, alternatively, it may choose to 
preserve the initial tax burden by recycling the eco-tax collections into lower tax rates in 
other tax categories. The meta-studies in Maxim and Zander (2019) and Maxim (2020) 
summarize the scope of these environmental tax recycling policies and their degree of 
success in different case studies for actually enacted or for just simulated eco-tax 
policies.   
The tax recycling approach has the advantage of keeping the size of the government 
constant in terms of its expenditures, combined tax revenues and public deficit. This 
policy option would be, quite naturally, the one causing the minimal distortion on the 
structure of the economy. However, some distortions, even if small, will persist. We 
will model any remaining distortion by scaling up or down the size of the economy 
while maintaining the basic structure as untouched as possible. This is the key to 
isolating price and quantity effects and it allows us to estimate price-induced income 
effects. These income effects, in turn, will drive the final consumption response and the 
corresponding adjustment in production levels. Technology wise, carbon emissions 
depend directly on production levels, and thus the link between eco-taxation policies 
and the subsequent carbon emissions. The proposed model therefore encompasses an 
economic side with an environmentally linked side and captures the eco-tax induced 
cost and income transmission mechanisms. 
We select Spain in 2015 for this case study for two main reasons. The first reason is that 
eco-tax policies in Spain have been quite timid in the past and ample room for new tax 
policy initiatives do exist (OECD, 2019). In general, the implementation of eco-tax 
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policies within the EU has not been stellar and just a few countries have taken up this 
policy tool in a limited way (Bosquet, 2000; OECD, 2019) and Spain is not one of them. 
Even without broad and active eco-tax policies, Spain’s per capita emissions are slightly 
below the EU average whereas its carbonization index is slightly above (Padilla and 
Duro, 2013). Hence, room for improvement of environmental quality using eco-taxation 
tools exists and the possible effects of its adoption should be explored. The second 
reason, quite more pragmatic, is the availability of disaggregated interindustry and 
socio-economic data for 2015 which permits the convenient implementation of a 
multisectoral model that captures most of the active economic interactions. 
In the next Section, we outline the main properties and novelties of the implemented 
interindustry model both in economic and environmental terms. In Section 3 we 
formulate the two eco-tax policy strategies and define the nature of the undertaken 
simulations whereas in Section 4 we present and discuss some of the results both in 
environmental and welfare terms to appraise the possibility of double benefits that 
would follow the adoption of the eco-tax policies. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 The production side 
 
We consider an interindustry economy with i, j=1, 2,…, n economic sectors. We endow 
the economy with a productive technology that we represent by an n×n non-negative 
matrix A = (aji). The coefficients in matrix A represent the available technology and are 
calculated from the empirical data by dividing the level of intermediate input j used in 
sector i to produce its output (see Miller and Blair, 2009, Chapter 2). All commodities 
are at the same type inputs and outputs for the production process. We envision 
production as taking place in stages, which facilitates model description and improves 
model clarity. Labor L = (Lj) and capital K = (Kj) generate a non-produced composite 
input V = (Vj) in fixed proportions with input intensities :j j . We call this 
composite good value-added. Value-added and materials, in turn, combine to produce 
domestic output ( )d djxX  also in fixed proportions  :ji ja v whereas total output X = 
(xj) is the result of combining, domestic output and imports ( )
m m
jxX  once again using 
fixed proportions :D Mj j  . We therefore keep constant the structure of the economy 
assuming fixed technological proportions in all three of the productive stages: 
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2.2 The cost side  
We distinguish between basic and purchase prices. The basic price pj of a commodity 
includes the domestic production cost cj and the cost of the imported input measured by 
the current international price mjp . The domestic cost includes the cost of all material 
inputs and the cost of the incorporated value-added. Basic prices pj cover all unitary 
costs whereas purchase qj prices are basic prices augmented by a nontransferable value-
added tax vatj. Domestic production takes place under an indirect production tax tj 
whereas the use of labor in value-added conveys the payment of an industry payroll tax 
sj. The full set of exchange values with the explicit role of all intervening taxes is: 
(1 )j j jq vat p            (2.1) 
d m m
j j j j jp c p             (2.2) 
1
(1 ) ( )
n
j j v j ij i
i
c t v a p

             (2.3) 
(1 )v j j js                  (2.4) 
In these expressions, v represent the price index of the composite value-added input 
and ℓ and represent the unitary prices of labor and capital services. Notice that all 
these expressions reflect the underlying unitary cost functions under fixed proportions. 
2.3 The dynamics of the wage rate 
We assume a simple adjustment rule for the wage rate that captures that workers 
negotiate with firms’ representatives to keep the purchasing power of wages. We 
measure their degree of success by a coefficient 0 ≤ ≤ 1 with  = 0 indicating no 
success in keeping up with the evolution of prices and  = 1 showing full adjustment to 
changing prices: 
0 (1 ( ( ) 1),1)Max CPI      q        (3.1) 
In this expression CPI represents a consumer’s price index built upon purchase prices q 
= (qj) and 
0 is the initial wage rate. The volume of social transfers mp that families 
receive from the public sector follows the same type of adjustment rule. By analogy: 
  0 (1 ( ( ) 1),1)p p mm m Max CPI    q       (3.2) 
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The adjustment coefficients andm may respond to different formation rules 
although, typically, the public coefficient m functions as the leading target for setting 
the private one . 
2.4 The income side 
The production activities in the economy yield income to families. This income includes 
all receipts from the use of primary factors (labor mL and capital mK) along with any 
social transfers mp from the public sector. This defines total income mt. Since the labor 
income of employed families is subject to a personal payroll tax at rate th, their gross 
income mg is the result of detracting this payment from total income. In turn, disposable 
income md is gross income minus labor and capital income taxes, which have different 
tax rates tL and tK, reflecting an actual property of the tax system. Out of disposable 
income, families use a marginal propensity to consume 0 <  to allocate a given 
fraction mc of their disposable income to finance consumption, with the remaining 
disposable income going straight to private savings. To wit: 
t L K pm m m m            (4.1) 
g t h Lm m t m            (4.2) 
( )d g L L p K Km m t m m t m             (4.3) 
c dm m            (4.4) 
We keep the overall structure of final demand for consumption c = (cj) using a fixed 
proportions demand scheme governed by non-negative weights j. Therefore, total 
consumption demand will scale up or down according to the level of expendable income 
mc, which in turn depends on the accrued factorial and social transfers incomes, the 
personal tax rates for the different sources of income, and purchase prices qj: 
1 1
( (1 ) (1 ) (1 ))j c j L h L K K p L
j n n
i i i i
i i
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   (5) 
At the same time, total factorial incomes mL and mK and social transfers mp will depend 
on factors’ prices ℓ and and the adjustments operating through the consumers’ 
price index.Any shock modifying these prices, such as those ensuing from the 
adoption of an eco-tax, will have an effect of their levels. Hence, also in consumption 
demand.  
2.5 Eco-tax design and CO2 emissions 
The eco-tax eco=(ecoj) falls upon domestic production costs and we assume that the 
government defines its actual burden in proportion to total (i.e. direct and indirect) 
sectoral emissions of CO2. Let us denote the direct emissions coefficient of CO2 by e = 
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(ej). We can calculate the overall level of emissions E using the direct coefficients 
vector and the level of domestic production:  
dE  e X           (6) 
Using matrix A we compute the multiplier matrix L: 
1( ) L I A           (7) 
From here, the total (direct plus indirect) coefficient vector  of emissions is obtained 
from: 
 λ e L           (8) 
This vector allows us to order all sectors by their total emissions coefficients. We then 
calibrate the eco-tax scheme so that it satisfies that eco is proportional to the vector  
and, moreover, has the same collection capacity that a given homogenous eco-tax which 
the government uses to set a tax collection target.  
The introduction of an eco-tax on the domestic component of production costs would 
modify the equation for basic prices. Combining expressions (2.2) and (2.3) yields: 
1
(1 ) ( (1 ) ( ))
n
d m m
j j j j v j ij i j j
i
p eco t v a p p  

              (9) 
All basic and purchase prices will readjust to the new tax whereas the wage rate and 
social transfers will track down the change in prices and incorporate it into the system 
with a double effect.  On the one hand, there is an additional push on prices through the 
wage rate; on the other hand, factorial labor income and social transfers also change 
and, as a result, we need to rescale consumption demand. We measure the effects on 
domestic output using the multiplier matrix L: 
d  X L c           (10) 
From here we can now evaluate changes in total emissions levels post eco-tax by: 
dE     e x e L c        (11) 
2.6 The welfare side 
The eco-tax will modify prices. Since we keep the whole structure of the economy as 
unaltered as possible, except for the income rescaling and its derived effect on 
consumption demand, there are no substitution effects. The rescaling only generates 
income effects. Hence, all the welfare consequences will be exclusively income related. 
This allows us to eliminate the price-induced substitution effects in the calculation of 
the mitigation effects on CO2 emissions. Therefore, all the derived changes will be pure 
volume effects within the given structure of production and consumption. Likewise, 
given the absence of smooth convex utilities, we need not refer to the usual Hicksian 
welfare measures nor in fact to any explicit utility function. We use instead Slutsky’s 
definitions that need not an optimal expenditure function. With no substitution in 
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consumption, it is possible to show that Slutsky’s equivalent and compensating 
variations coincide. Hence, we can measure the money metric change in welfare W 
brought about by the eco-tax by: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )c c c cW g m g m g m m    q q q      (12) 
In this expression, the index "1" refers to the post eco-tax situation and the index "0" to 
the initial situation. The function g(q, mc) measures the incurred expenditure level at the 
vector of purchase prices q and income level mc. 
2.7 The chain of events 
The following scheme reproduces in a sequential way the main chain of events and set 
of repercussions that the model tries to capture. In fact, we know that the determination 
of all variables is simultaneous but it is always helpful to visualize the chain stepwise: 
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The environmental tax eco in the beginning of the chain triggers changes in basic and 
purchase prices that end up affecting the consumer price index CPI which, through the 
adjustment process in wages and public transfers, give rise to an impact in consumption 
demand and domestic production levels. From here, and at the end of the chain, the 
model allows us to evaluate the induced change in CO2 emissions and in money metric 
welfare once all the ripple effects have accumulated. 
3. Simulations 
We use input-output and National Accounting income data published by the National 
Institute for Statistics (INE: http://www.ine.es) for the Spanish economy in 2015. We 
rearrange the data using the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework. The novelty 
of this SAM is that it distinguishes between basic valued and purchase valued final 
transactions. Thanks to the distinction, we can calculate separately basic and purchase 
prices as defined in expressions (2). We calibrate the model’s parameters in technology 
and demand (expressions (1) and (5)) to derive unitary basic prices and factor prices. 
The calibration methodology entails using the standard normalization in CGE and 
interindustry modeling by which all the selected units have exactly the value of one 
Euro. This normalization solves the problem that reported monetary values in input-
output data do not distinguish the physical and the currency unit parts (see Cardenete et 
al, 2016, Chapter 6, for technical details in calibration issues). 
We approximate both adjustment coefficients  and m with a single value μ that we 
obtain from data published by the Spanish National Institute for Statistics (INE, 2014) 
that shows that, in general, salaries’ growth lags behind price increases measured by the 
consumer’s price index CPI. We take the value μ=0.8 as a reasonable approximation to 
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the data. Information on estimated sectorial emissions of CO2 (in equivalence units) for 
2015 comes from the environmental database compiled by the National Institute for 
Statistics. We use these emissions along with sectorial domestic output to calculate the 
direct emissions coefficients e. 
We consider two possible policies regarding the eco-tax. First, we evaluate its effects 
when wages adjust partially and the government uses the accrued eco-tax collections to 
reduce the public deficit. However, this scenario changes the size of the government in 
terms of its increased tax revenue and introduces a distortion in the structure of the 
economy. Second, we eliminate this distortion by recycling the new tax collections to 
reduce labor payroll taxes, both the industry and the personal rates. The size of the 
government remains essentially constant in terms of aggregate expenditure and tax 
collections, hence in its deficit too, except for the partial value adjustment in social 
transfers (through expression 3.2). Therefore, we need to compute the neutral reduction 
in the payroll tax rates that would offset the increased collection capacity of the eco-tax. 
This approach is the most common one for revenue recycling (Maxim and Zander, 
2019). Notice that we select the level of fixed revenue in nominal terms since the 
government cannot foresee the endogenous change in the CPI. Hence, real tax revenues 
will differ ex-post from the nominal target. Simply stated, the government observes its 
current tax collections and it fixes the observed (nominal) base as its constant target. 
We calculate the specific eco-tax rates running first an auxiliary simulation with a 
homogeneous and common sectorial rate of 1 percent. We determine the tax collections 
under the common rate and then we re-dimension the sectorial rates in proportion to the 
total CO2 footprint using the total emissions multiplier vector  (expression (8)) but at 
the same time keeping the target eco-tax revenue constant. The non-homogeneous eco-
tax rates play two roles. In the short run, higher emitters of CO2 receive higher tax rates 
and their tax burden reflect their contribution to total emissions; in the long run this 
assignment of tax rates should work to incentivize the use of less polluting technologies 
either through price-driven input substitution or through the adoption of more efficient 
production recipes (Rose, 1983). The current model does not capture these long run 
issues, for they require an altogether different modeling platform, especially because 
under these two situations the economy would undergo structural change.  
We solve the model using GAMS under a discontinuous non-linear programming 
algorithm1 that deals with the non-smooth expressions (3). The solver computes all 
prices, income levels, emissions and welfare. Since the wage rate is endogenous, we use 
the price of capital services as numéraire. All value magnitudes are normalized ex-post 
using the CPI. This ensures that we can compare real magnitudes (based upon their 
purchasing power) after all endogenous adjustments take place (see Guerra and Sancho, 
2018, and Guerra et al, 2019).  
4. Results and discussion 
                                                          
1 We use CONOPT as the default solver and the algorithm DNLP available within CONOPT. 
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Figure 1 and Tables 1 through 4 summarize the main results that the current model 
produces. In Figure 1 we visualize the vectors of direct e and total  emission 
coefficients of CO2 for the classification of n=30 sectors that we use in the data. Name 
descriptions appear in the headings. Notice that out of the 30 sectors only 5 of them 
have significant direct coefficients above the mark 0.40. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
We consider two main simulations. In the simulation labeled as "No tax recycling", the 
government sets up the eco-tax on top of the current tax system. Total tax revenue 
increases and the government just uses it to correct the public deficit. In contrast, in the 
"tax recycling" simulation, the government fine-tunes the rates of the two payroll taxes 
to keep total tax revenue unchanged. In both simulations the wage rate and social 
transfers partially adjust to the new eco-tax induced changes in purchase prices through 
the coefficient μ=0.8.   
In Table 1, we present the income results that would follow under the two simulations 
next to benchmark data for ease of comparison. As expected, in the no-recycling 
scenario all income levels fall in real terms. The eco-tax erodes the purchasing power of 
all sources of private income and income adjustments working through the CPI cannot 
keep track with the erosion. When the eco-tax revenue is recycled, however, gross, 
disposable and expendable income all increase even though total income falls in real 
terms. The reduction in the personal payroll tax th, that directly affects private labor 
income (expression 4.2), explains this fact. At the same time, the reduction of the 
industry payroll tax rates sj lowers the pressure on prices and yields a lower CPI. Hence, 
the effect of the lower CPI also helps in reducing the losses in real income levels. 
[Table 1 around here] 
We display the corresponding tax collections, again in real terms, in Table 2. Recall that 
we calculated the eco-tax rates using as a target the accrued tax collection of a 1 percent 
homogeneous tax rate on domestic production costs. We then preserve this level of 
revenue but assign individual tax rates according to each sector total CO2 footprint. In 
aggregate terms, the eco-tax would represent a burden of a bit over 5 percent of all tax 
revenues in both simulations (5.1 and 5.3 percent, respectively). In the tax recycling 
case, lower payroll taxes would compensate for the increased eco-tax burden. This 
compensating reduction in rates would be about 15.5 percent. Taken together, the load 
of all payroll taxes, should they be reduced by 15.5 percent, would fall from being 36.7 
percent of the total burden in the no tax recycling case to being 32.8 percent in the tax 
recycling case—close to four percent points less. The effect on the rest of taxes (income 
and sales taxes) seems to be slightly detrimental but quantitatively unimportant in value.  
[Table 2 around here] 
In Table 3, we show the effects of the eco-tax in terms of CO2 emissions and welfare 
and allows us to consider them in terms of a possible double dividend. In the no tax 
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recycling simulation, we observe that the effect of the eco-tax is a reduction in the total 
volume of CO2 emissions of 1,429 million of metric tons, just a fall of 0.51 percent over 
the benchmark level. Since the (average) eco-tax is 1 percent, this 0.51 value also 
corresponds to the empirical elasticity response in this tax scenario. Given the linear 
nature of the interindustry model, any proportioned increase in the eco-tax rate would 
imply the same type of response in emissions reduction. We should therefore expect 
that an (average) 2 percent eco-tax would reduce emissions in about 1 percent, or 2,858 
million of metric tons, and so on. The reduction in incomes that we detected in Table 1 
takes the form of a welfare loss here in Table 3. The welfare cost, measured by 
Slutsky’s equivalent variation, would amount to 7,566 million of Euros. The additional 
level of expendable income mc that, in percent, would offset the estimated welfare loss 
would be 1.26 percent over the initial level of expendable income. This figure indicates 
the level of erosion in the purchasing power of families, even when we incorporate 
adjustments in income levels that track down the evolution of purchase prices. We do 
not observe a double dividend: emissions fall but welfare falls as well. 
[Table 3 around here] 
The opposite happens when the government keeps the nominal size of its revenue 
constant. In this case, it is feasible to reduce the rates of the payroll taxes. As we already 
observed in Table 1, disposable and expendable income would tend to increase. The 
specific effect detected here is that emissions would in fact rise, even if the change turns 
out to be small. Families would now be better off as the positive EV indicates. We can 
estimate the money metric welfare increase in 1,247 million of Euros and the 
compensating reduction in income would be now small but negative. In other words, 
this new income in the hands of families, liberated by the payroll tax reduction, would 
boost their consumption demand, in turn driving output and emissions upwards through 
the multiplier matrix L. Once again, we do not observe a double dividend. Families are 
better off but the environmental quality of the economy deteriorates as emissions 
increase. As before, linearity is again useful in this second scenario to gauge the effects 
of the same policy under different, but proportioned, eco-tax parameters. 
The role of the adjustment parameter  on the wage rate seems to be less intense than 
the decision on the type of tax policy. In Table 4, we compare the central assumption 
(= 0.8) with the emissions and welfare changes in two extreme cases—indeed, not 
very realistic—that correspond to no adjustment whatsoever (= 0) and full adjustment 
(= 1).  
[Table 4 around here] 
Higher values of the parameter  give rise to less erosion in welfare capturing the fact 
that the wage rate would command higher levels of income. Similarly, the reduction in 
emissions appears to be inversely related to this parameter. In none of the above six 
cases we detect the possibility of a double dividend; only under the empirically 
unrealistic assumption that the wage rate does not adjust at all but the tax burden 
12 
 
remains constant we would observe a fall in emissions, which is almost negligible, and 
an also small fall in welfare. Thus, the type of implemented tax policy seems to be quite 
more determinant in the evaluated results than the value of the adjustment parameter in 
the wage rate. 
5. Conclusions and implications 
We have explored the reach and limits of eco-taxation using a simple interindustry 
model in which we keep the structure of the economy with the minimal possible 
alterations. The conceptual novelty of the model is that it breaks the classical dichotomy 
by linking prices and quantities through income adjustments. We compute the set of 
prices that keeps most of the same economic structure working after the government 
levies a new tax on CO2 emitters. We depart from the typical neoclassical determination 
of the wage rate and assume that it is determined through wage negotiations. These 
negotiations are successful only in part, reflecting the distributional frictions that 
commonly occur between labor and capital. True enough, real-world situations 
encompass many more explanatory factors than models can successfully accommodate. 
Models, though, have the ability to isolate some of these factors and ascertain their 
specific impact. The model we use isolate the wage rate and makes it endogenous 
following a partial adjustment rule. If prices rise, so does the wage rate, but if prices fall 
then it is downward rigid and remains at the initial value. We examine this behavior of 
the wage rate under two alternative tax policies. Inasmuch as we keep unaltered the 
remaining structure of the economy, we are able to visualize and quantify the role 
played by the dynamics of the wage rate and the tax policy strategies on carbon 
emissions and private welfare.  
Under our assumptions, we cannot conclude that a double dividend will occur. Either 
the tax policy (first scenario with no tax recycling) improves environmental quality but 
erodes welfare, or the results become reversed and welfare improvements go along with 
lower environmental quality (second scenario with neutral tax recycling). This result, 
namely that an eco-tax policy may end up achieving the opposite of what was intended, 
runs contrary to intuition, or at least to partial equilibrium based intuition. Hence, the 
relevance of studying the issue under an approach that accounts for both direct and 
indirect outcomes. In our case, tax revenue recycling boosts private expendable income, 
which increases final demand, gross output and emissions. The design of the policy 
would be incomplete, and possibly erroneous, if we do not take into account and 
measure its possible repercussions.  
In the tax recycling simulation we see that the payroll tax would be reduced. In a fully 
general CGE model with smooth production functions this reduction would be an 
incentive for firms to substitute capital for labor. We rule out this possibility in the 
analysis since we want to keep the structure of the economy under the minimal set of 
distortions. The reason is the desire to isolate income driven effects from price induced 




Recall also that the results we calculate eliminate all substitution effects in consumption 
since we do not use any smooth utility function. Hence, households’ consumption does 
not respond to changing prices, only to price induced changes in income levels. This is 
no doubt a limitation but has the advantage of unmingling income and substitution 
effects and offers an appraisal unbiased by the workings of the latter. The standing 
assumption is perhaps that the observation of a double dividend would be likelier under 
strong substitution effects that, guided by adequately designed eco-taxation, divert final 
demand and production from intense emitters to more eco-friendly activities. The 
testing of this assumption requires, minimally, a non-linear modeling approach that is 
capable of dealing with both smooth utilities and smooth production frontiers.  
We must also mention that we do not consider distributional issues since our database 
use the single representative consumer assumption and thus we do not distinguish 
families by socioeconomic characteristics. This is a limitation of the current database 
that does not allow us to examine who would gain or lose in welfare relative terms from 
the examined policies. 
Finally, the eco-tax policies we have looked at work exclusively in a pure public finance 
basis. We have not examined, for instance, the effects of recycling tax receipts to 
finance and foster expenditure policies that could promote environmental efficiency 
gains via new technologies or alternative goods and services. The model we use is static 
in nature and this type of positive dynamic change effects cannot be studied within its 
current framework. 
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Table 1: Income levels 
(millions of €) 
Benchmark:        
CPI=1 
No tax recycling:      
CPI=1.0220 
Tax recycling:           
CPI=1.0074 
Labor income mL 410,583 408,815 (-0.43%) 409,983 (-0.15%) 
Capital income mK 453,464 443,703 (-2.15%) 450,153 (-0.73%) 
Social transfers mp 170,583 169,849 (-0.43%) 170,334 (-0.21%) 
Total income mt 1,034,630 1,022,367 (-1.18%) 1,030,470 (-0.40%) 
Gross income mg 993,618 981,532 8 (-1.21%) 995,868 (0.33%) 
Disposable income md 876,130 865,287 (-1.24%) 877,923 (0.20%) 














































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Tax revenue  
(millions of €) 
Benchmark:        
CPI=1 
No tax recycling:      
CPI=1.0220 
Tax recycling:           
CPI=1.0074 
Eco-tax 0 20,095 20,075 
Personal payroll tax 41,012 40,835  34,602 
Industry payroll tax 103,871 103,424  87,636 
Rest of taxes 230,735 229,040  230,562 
Total tax revenue 375,618 393,394 372,875 
Payroll taxes reduction: 15.5% 
 
 
Table 3: Double dividend? Benchmark No tax recycling Tax recycling 
Emissions (millions of MT) 279,731 278,302 279,967 
Percentage change   -0,51% 0.08% 
Welfare change (EV) -7,566 1,247 
Compensating income   1.26% -0.21% 
 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity to 
parameter    
No tax 
recycling     Tax recycling 
  =0 =0.8 =1 =0 =0.8 =1 
Emissions change in % -0.64% -0.51% -0.46% -0.01% 0.08% 0.11% 
Welfare change (EV) -9,702 -7,566 -6,844 -0,070     1,247 1,673 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
